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Yale Universityavailable options would make them feel. Yet, recent
research suggests that such predictions, or affective fore-
casts, often are inaccurate. There are, after all, a number
of obstacles to successful emotional time travel—people
are likely to err in affective forecasting if they inaccurately
envision the future event itself, misremember how they
felt in response to similar past events, or fail to ade-
quately take into account the host of potential differences
between their physical and psychological state at the time
of forecasting and the time of experiencing (Wilson &
Gilbert, 2003). As a result of these shortcomings in the
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emotional time travel machine, people often overestimate
or underestimate the intensity and duration of their feel-
ings in response to a future event and they may occasion-
ally misjudge the specific emotion they will experience.
Although sometimes harmless, such affective forecast-
ing errors can have important intrapersonal and inter-
personal costs (for a recent review, see Dunn & Laham,
in press). Beyond driving people to pursue goals that
are unlikely to produce genuine happiness (Gilbert &
Wilson, 2000), affective forecasting errors may lead
people to make poor medical decisions (Riis et al., 2005;
Sieff, Dawes, & Loewenstein, 1999). In addition, affec-
tive forecasting errors have been implicated in psycho-
logical disorders (e.g., Cox & Swinson, 1994; Craske,
Rapee, & Barlow, 1988), and because people often use
their own predicted feelings as a starting point in imag-
ining how someone else would feel in a particular situa-
tion, the shortcomings of emotional time travel may
beget interpersonal misunderstandings (e.g., Van Boven
& Loewenstein, in press; Van Boven, Loewenstein, &
Dunning, 2003).
Yet, although individuals who are relatively adept at
affective forecasting are likely to have an edge in finding
happiness, making good decisions, and understanding
other people, we know almost nothing about who those
individuals are or how to identify them. There is some
evidence that older people and East Asians may be
less prone than others to overestimate their emotional
responses to life events, although their relatively unbi-
ased forecasts may not be particularly accurate (Lam,
Buehler, McFarland, & Ross, 2005; Wilson, Gilbert, &
Salthouse, 2001). Indeed, because most previous studies
have examined people’s forecasts and experiences regard-
ing only a single event, it is unclear whether there are sta-
ble individual differences in forecasting ability. In the
few studies that have required participants to report
multiple forecasts and experiences, however, substantial
individual variability in forecasting accuracy has been
observed (Kahneman & Snell, 1992; Totterdell, Parkinson,
Briner, & Reynolds, 1997).
What personal attributes might predict individual
differences in affective forecasting ability? Although a
number of variables, such as gender, age, and life expe-
rience, may be associated with forecasting ability, we
believe that emotional intelligence (EI) may be a mean-
ingful predictor of individual differences in this domain.
EI refers to the processes involved in the perception,
use, understanding, and management of one’s own
and others’ affective states (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).
Whereas alternative conceptualizations of EI (e.g., Bar-
On, 1997; Petrides & Furnham, 2003) is based primar-
ily on popularized notions of the construct (e.g.,
Goleman, 1995, 1998) or well-established dimensions
of personality (e.g., the Big Five), Mayer and Salovey’s
(1997) ability-based model of EI involves the accurate
processing of emotion-relevant information (e.g., facial
expressions), the use of emotions in reasoning, the under-
standing of emotional cues, and the regulation of emotion-
driven behavior.
EI ability is reliably measured as a set of mental skills
with performance tests such as the Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer,
Salovey, & Caruso, 2002a). Evidence is accumulating
that MSCEIT scores are related to a wide range of out-
comes of psychological and social importance. For
example, MSCEIT scores are associated positively with
quality interpersonal relationships and social compe-
tence and associated negatively with social deviance,
anxiety, and depression (for a review, see Brackett &
Salovey, 2004; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).
The MSCEIT measures performance on four cen-
tral subcomponents of EI: (a) perception of emotion,
(b) use of emotion to facilitate thought, (c) under-
standing of emotion, and (d) management of emotion.
The latter two subcomponents may be particularly rel-
evant to affective forecasting ability. Individuals who
score high on Understanding Emotions have abundant
knowledge of how emotions blend (e.g., anger and dis-
gust together lead to contempt) and metamorphize
(e.g., annoyance leads to anger, which leads to rage).
On the MSCEIT, Understanding Emotions is assessed
by asking individuals to decide which specific emotions
are likely to result from a particular, complex situation
as well as how one or more emotions might lead to
another different emotion. Participants, for example,
are asked to judge the extent to which a woman who
was annoyed with a coworker for taking credit for a
project would feel anger, annoyance, or frustration
when the coworker took credit again. Thus, individu-
als who score high in this domain of EI may have an
advantage in affective forecasting because of their abil-
ity to identify the specific emotions that stem from
complex affective experiences.
The Emotion Management (EM) domain may have
even broader relevance to affective forecasting accu-
racy. Individuals who score high in this domain show
strong recognition of how emotions are actively dealt
with following emotion-provoking situations; these
individuals exhibit insight into the ways in which an ini-
tial emotion or mood may be reinforced, reduced, or pre-
served. On the EM section of the MSCEIT, test-takers
are asked to evaluate how various behaviors, social sit-
uations, and subjective construals will minimize, maxi-
mize, or maintain a particular emotional experience.
Participants, for example, are asked to judge the extent
to which a person’s positive, carefree mood would be
preserved by ignoring the good feeling, focusing on all
the things that are going well for her or trying to cheer
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up a depressed relative. Thus, although the term “emo-
tion management” is commonly used to refer to the
capacity to reduce negative emotions, the EM domain
of the MSCEIT is designed to capture a broader under-
standing of how positive and negative emotions can be
both minimized and maximized, as well as preserved.
Thus, individuals who score high on EM may make
more accurate affective forecasts because they possess
sophisticated insight into the internal and external
forces that interact with a given event to produce emo-
tional experiences. For example, in predicting how she
will feel the day after her favored candidate is elected
president, a woman high in EM might recognize that
her feelings will be driven not only by the outcome itself
but also by whether she will be surrounded by other
political aficionados (reinforcing her positive feelings)
or will be busy with other unrelated activities (diluting
her positive feelings). Across a broad range of situa-
tions, individuals who score high in EM should be more
adept at calibrating their affective forecasts because of
their ability to take into account the idiosyncratic fea-
tures that will mitigate or intensify their reactions to an
emotion-relevant event.
Although we hypothesized that forecasting ability
would be related to scores on a performance measure of
emotional intelligence, we did not expect that forecast-
ing ability would be related to self-reported EI. Recent
research has demonstrated that performance and self-
report measures of EI are not strongly correlated (rs <
.25) and performance, but not self-report, measures of
EI predict social behavior (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman,
Lerner, & Salovey, in press). Indeed, it appears that
EI operates in a similar fashion to cognitive intelli-
gence such that a self-report measure cannot be used as
a proxy measure for actual intelligence (Dunning, Johnson,
Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998).
Thus, whereas actual EI should promote accurate affec-
tive forecasts, as described in detail above, there is little
reason to believe that simply perceiving oneself as emo-
tionally intelligent would confer any benefits for affec-
tive forecasting.
In the present research, we examined whether EI—
and the understanding and managing emotions subcom-
ponents in particular—predicted affective forecasting
ability. Participants completed EI measures and later
were asked to estimate how they would feel and report
their actual feelings in response to events, including a
presidential election and term paper (Study 1) and a bas-
ketball game (Study 2). We hypothesized that individu-
als who were high in EI would make more accurate
affective forecasts regarding their emotional response to
these events. We further hypothesized that only a per-
formance measure of EI (the MSCEIT), but not a self-
report measure, would predict forecasting ability.
STUDY 1
Method
Overview. At the beginning of the fall 2004 semester,
participants completed a battery of pretest measures,
including one performance and one self-report measure
of EI (the MSCEIT and Self-Rated Emotional Intelligence
Scale [SREIS], respectively). Later in the semester, partic-
ipants were asked to predict how they would feel follow-
ing the U.S. presidential election and then to report their
actual feelings after the election. Finally, about 1 month
later, participants were asked to predict how they would
feel after receiving their term paper grade and then to
report their actual feelings after receiving it.
Participants. In return for extra course credit, 84
students in a psychology course at Yale University pro-
vided data for all phases of the study as part of a larger
research project on emotion-related skills and social
functioning. Twenty-five participants were men, 53 were
women, and 6 did not report their gender.
Emotional Intelligence
MSCEIT. The MSCEIT (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso,
2002a) is a 141-item performance test that operational-
izes the four emotion-related abilities (i.e., perception use,
understanding, and management of emotion) that com-
prise Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) theory of EI. The test
requires participants to identify emotions in faces and
designs, to indicate feelings that facilitate and interfere
with specific thought processes, to answer questions on
how emotions combine to form other emotions and how
emotional reactions blend and progress over time, and
finally to choose the consequences of various forms of
emotional management in both self- and other-relevant
situations. The MSCEIT yields scores for each of the four
domains of EI as well as a total score. Correct answers on
the test are measured by expert and consensus scoring,
which closely converge (rs > .90; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso,
& Sitarenios, 2003). In consensus scoring, respondents
are given credit for correct answers to the extent that
their answers match those provided by the normative
sample (more than 5,000 heterogeneous individuals from
North America). Similarly, in expert scoring, respondents
are given credit for answers that match the answers from
a pool of emotions experts (21 members of the Interna-
tional Society for Research on Emotion). Split-half relia-
bilities in the present study were greater than .77 for the
four subscales and .94 for the total score. More informa-
tion on the psychometric properties and validity of the
test can be found elsewhere (Brackett & Salovey, 2004;
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002b).
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SREIS. The SREIS (Brackett et al., in press) was devel-
oped to map onto the MSCEIT; it measures people’s self-
reported ability to perceive, use, understand, and manage
emotions. For example, on the SREIS, the perception of
emotion is assessed with statements such as, “I am good
at reading people’s facial expressions.” Participants rate
their agreement with each item from disagree strongly
(1) to agree strongly (5). As demonstrated by Brackett et
al. (in press), the SREIS has a similar factor structure to
the MSCEIT and scores on the SREIS correlate in the
expected directions with neuroticism (r = –.42), well-
being (r = .47), and life satisfaction (r = .25). Consistent
with this previous research, the SREIS had acceptable
reliability (α = .84) in the present study, as did each of
the subscales (αs > .70).
Forecasts and Experiences
Event 1: Presidential election. Participants completed
in-class surveys on U.S. Election Day (November 2,
2004) and 2 days after the election (November 4,
2004). On Election Day, participants reported how
happy they were feeling currently and predicted how
happy they would be 2 days later if George W. Bush
won the election and if John F. Kerry won the election,
as well as reporting which candidate they preferred. On
November 4, participants again rated their current hap-
piness. Consistent with Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg,
and Wheatley’s (1998, Study 3) election study, partici-
pants rated their current and predicted happiness on
9-point scales ranging from not at all happy (1) to
extremely happy (9), allowing for direct comparisons
between forecasted and actual happiness.
Event 2: Term paper. Approximately 1 month after
the election, participants completed an in-class survey
when they handed in their term papers. They then com-
pleted a second survey when they received their graded
papers back 3 weeks later. On the first survey (Time 1),
participants rated their current feelings of happiness
and sadness on scales ranging from not at all happy (1)
to extremely happy (9) and from not at all sad (1) to
extremely sad (9). Next, participants reported the grade
they were expecting on the paper. Using the 9-point
scale, participants predicted how happy they would be
after getting their paper back if they received a grade (a)
one step higher than they were expecting (e.g., an A–
instead of a B+) and (b) two steps higher than they were
expecting. In addition, participants rated how sad they
would be if they received a grade (a) one step lower and
(b) two steps lower than they were expecting. Three
weeks later, upon receiving their graded term paper,
participants again rated their current happiness and
sadness on the same scales used at Time 1.
Results
Analytic strategy. To create an index of forecasting
(in)accuracy, we first calculated the absolute value of the
difference between each participant’s affective forecast
and experience for each event.1 This measure was used
because we were primarily interested in the size rather
than the direction of errors in affective forecasts, that is,
we saw no clear justification for predicting that people
high in EI would be less susceptible to forecasting errors
in just one direction (i.e., overestimation vs. underesti-
mation). Participants’ accuracy scores for the election
were significantly correlated with their accuracy scores
for the term paper (r = .28, p = .009), suggesting that
some people are indeed more accurate forecasters than
others across situations. Thus, we averaged participants’
accuracy scores for the election and the term paper to
create a cross-situational index of forecasting accuracy.
Main analyses. To test whether EI predicted forecast-
ing accuracy, we first entered total MSCEIT scores into
a regression predicting the cross-situational forecast-
ing accuracy index. Supporting our hypothesis, MSCEIT
scores significantly predicted forecasting accuracy (β =
–.22), t(82) = –2.04, p = .045; participants who were
higher in EI exhibited smaller errors (i.e., greater accu-
racy) in affective forecasting. Next, we entered par-
ticipants’ scores on each of the four separate branches
of the MSCEIT (but not the total score) into a regres-
sion analysis predicting forecasting accuracy. The EM
domain emerged as the sole significant predictor of fore-
casting accuracy (β = –.31), t(79) = –2.38, p = .02, all
other branches (ts < 1); likewise, there was a significant
zero-order correlation between forecasting accuracy
and EM (r = –.30, p = .006) but not between accuracy
and any of the other domains (ps > .13). Because the EM
domain was driving the observed relationship between
the MSCEIT and forecasting accuracy, we used scores
for this domain as the primary independent variable in
all subsequent analyses.
Self-reported EI. To examine whether self-reported
EI predicted forecasting accuracy as well or better than
did ability-based EI, we entered EM scores from both
the SREIS and the MSCEIT into a regression analysis
predicting forecasting accuracy. As predicted, SREIS
scores failed to predict forecasting accuracy (t < 1),
whereas MSCEIT scores remained a significant predic-
tor of accuracy (β = –.30), t(77) = –2.73, p = .008, high-
lighting the apparent inadequacy of self-reported EI as
a predictor of forecasting ability. There were also no
significant zero-order correlations between forecasting
accuracy and SREIS-EM or SREIS-total scores (see
Table 1).
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Gender. As shown in Table 1, EM was related to
gender, with women scoring significantly higher than
men on this branch of the MSCEIT (although gender was
not significantly related to total scores on the MSCEIT).
In addition, women exhibited greater forecasting accu-
racy than did men. Therefore, we entered gender and EM
scores into a regression analysis predicting forecasting
accuracy, which revealed significant, independent effects
of both gender (β = –.25), t(75) = –2.25, p = .03, and EM
(β = –.24), t(75) = –2.17, p = .03 (see Table 1 for addi-
tional analyses controlling for gender).
Separate event analyses. Although averaging forecast-
ing accuracy scores across the election and paper situa-
tions provides the most reliable index of stable individual
differences in forecasting ability, we also conducted addi-
tional analyses for the term paper and election events sep-
arately.2 Consistent with the main analyses, MSCEIT–EM
scores significantly predicted forecasting accuracy for the
term paper (β = –.24), t(82) = –2.20, p = .03, and the elec-
tion (β = –.24), t(82) = –2.22, p = .03. Furthermore, com-
pared to those in the bottom tertile on EM, participants in
the top tertile exhibited relatively small forecasting errors
for both the election and the paper situations, as shown in
Table 2.
Discussion
The present study provides initial evidence of stable,
predictable individual differences in forecasting accu-
racy. Participants’ accuracy in forecasting their emo-
tional responses to the U.S. presidential election was
significantly related to their subsequent accuracy in
forecasting their emotional responses to receiving their
term paper grades. More important, the stable compo-
nent of forecasting accuracy was reliably predicted by
EI (as measured by the MSCEIT).3 Specifically, the EM
domain of the MSCEIT surfaced as the critical aspect of
EI for predicting forecast accuracy.
Although we hypothesized a priori that people who
scored high on the MSCEIT would exhibit greater fore-
casting accuracy due to their high EI, the observed rela-
tionship between MSCEIT scores and forecasting accuracy
also could have emerged if the high scorers on the MSCEIT
were more driven for consistency—people who inten-
tionally stuck to their guns and reported feeling the
same way they had predicted feeling also would appear
accurate on our forecasting index. This perspective sug-
gests that the relationship between MSCEIT scores and
accuracy on our forecasting index should have been
stronger for the election (in which only 2 days elapsed
between forecasts and experiences) than the term paper
(in which 3 weeks elapsed between forecasts and expe-
riences); intentionally maintaining consistency between
forecasts and experiences should be much easier when
little time has passed and one’s forecast can be easily
recalled. In fact, however, the relationship between
MSCEIT scores and forecasting accuracy was virtually
identical in the election and paper studies, casting doubt
on this alternative explanation. Still, it is conceivable
that the paper grade was more important than the elec-
tion outcome to most participants and that the relative
Dunn et al. / EI AND AFFECTIVE FORECASTING 89
TABLE 1: Correlation Matrix (Study 1)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Forecast accuracy (composite) — .75** .84** –.22* [–.19†] –.30** [–.25*] –.11 –.04 –.30**
2. Forecast accuracy (election) — .28** –.26* [–.23*] –.24* [–.19†] .00 .04 –.27*
3. Forecast accuracy (paper) — –.11 [–.09] –.24* [–.20†] –.16 –.09 –.23*
4. MSCEIT-total — .74** .11 .05 .12
5. MSCEIT-EM — .10 .03 .23*
6. SREIS-total — .85** .01
7. SREIS-EM — –.09
8. Gender —
NOTE: Coefficients in brackets are partial correlations, controlling for gender; all other coefficients are zero-order correlations. The forecast
accuracy indices were calculated such that higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy; thus, variables that are negatively correlated with these
indices are associated with better accuracy (i.e., smaller forecasting errors). MSCEIT = Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;
EM = Emotion Management; SREIS = Self-Rated Emotional Intelligence Test. Gender was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female; for calculation of
partial correlations, missing values of gender were set to .67 (sample mean).
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations on Forecast Accuracy
Index (by Event) for Participants in the Top and Bottom
Tertiles of MSCEIT-Emotion Management.
Bottom Tertile Top Tertile
M (SD) M (SD) Difference T
Presidential election 2.14 (1.51) 1.29 (0.94) 2.55*
Term paper 2.71 (1.58) 1.46 (1.26) 3.27*
Basketball game 3.08 (2.39) 1.08 (.76) 2.88*
NOTE: Higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy.
*p < .05.
importance of the paper grade provoked a greater drive
to achieve consistency between forecasts and experiences,
potentially canceling out the effect of the greater time
lapse on forecast-experience consistency.
Therefore, in Study 2, we asked participants to report
forecasts and experiences regarding an event—a school
basketball game—that was personally important to some
individuals and unimportant to others, and we assessed
personal importance using a well-validated measure
of sports team identification (Wann & Branscombe,
1993). If consistency motivation underlies the relation-
ship between MSCEIT scores and forecast-experience
correspondence, then this relationship should be stronger
among committed fans, for whom the game’s outcome is
high in importance and therefore more likely to trigger a
drive for consistency between forecasts and experiences.
As well as examining this alternative explanation,
Study 2 was designed to extend our investigation to
a somewhat different aspect of emotional experience;
whereas Study 1 examined happiness and sadness,
which are strongly related to emotional valence, Study
2 examined excitement, which is related to emotional
arousal. Finally, because we were initially somewhat
agnostic about which branch(es) of the MSCEIT would
best predict forecasting accuracy, it was important to
test whether the EM domain again would emerge as the




Participants. A total of 38 undergraduates in a mar-
keting course at Duke University completed all phases
of the present study in exchange for course credit. This
sample included 18 women, 18 men, and 2 who did not
report their gender.
Procedure. Participants completed the same battery
of pretest measures used in Study 1, including the MSCEIT
and the SREIS. A week later, participants were asked to
complete a short forecasting survey pertaining to a
major home game between the Duke men’s basketball
team and their long-time rivals from the University of
North Carolina (UNC), which was scheduled for the
next day. Participants were asked to imagine Duke (a)
winning and (b) losing the game against UNC and to
predict how excited they would be feeling the day after
each of these possible outcomes on a scale from not at
all (1) to extremely (9). To assess the personal impor-
tance of the basketball game for individual participants,
we asked them to complete Wann and Branscombe’s
(1993) seven-item sports team identification survey,
which includes items such as, “How important to you is it
that the team wins?” and “How important is being a fan
of the team to you?” Responses to these items were aver-
aged to create a team identification score for each par-
ticipant (α = .89). The day after the game against UNC
(which Duke lost), each participant was contacted via
e-mail and asked to rate their actual feelings of excitement
on the same 9-point scale used on the forecast survey.
Results
Main analyses. We conducted the same analyses as
in Study 1. Consistent with Study 1, participants’ total
scores on the MSCEIT significantly predicted forecast-
ing accuracy, with participants who scored higher in EI
exhibiting smaller errors (i.e., greater accuracy) in their
affective forecasts (β = –.49), t(36) = –3.38, p = .002.
When all four branches of the MSCEIT were entered into
a regression analysis predicting accuracy, the EM domain
again emerged as the sole significant predictor (β = –.52),
t(33) = –2.92, p = .006, all other branches, ts < 1.
However, there were significant zero-order correlations
between forecasting accuracy and the Use of Emotion
domain (r = –.35, p = .03) and the Understanding of
Emotion domain (r = –.37, p = .02), as well as the EM
domain (r = –.59, p < .0005). Consistent with Study 1,
participants who scored in the top tertile of EM exhibited
significantly smaller forecasting errors than those who
scored in the bottom tertile (see Table 2).
Self-reported EI. As in Study 1, we entered EM scores
from the SREIS and the MSCEIT into a regression pre-
dicting forecasting accuracy; only MSCEIT scores pre-
dicted accuracy, t(34) = –4.09, p < .0005, whereas SREIS
scores did not (t < 1). Furthermore, there were no signif-
icant zero-order correlations between forecasting accu-
racy and either SREIS–EM or SREIS-total scores (see
Table 3).
Gender. Women scored slightly higher than did men
on the MSCEIT overall and on the EM domain specifi-
cally, but gender failed to emerge as a significant predic-
tor of affective forecasting accuracy in the present study
(see Table 3). When both gender and EM were entered
into a regression predicting forecasting accuracy, the
effect of EM was significant (β = –.59), t(33) = –3.87,
p < .0005, but the effect of gender was not (t < 1; see
Table 3 for additional analyses controlling for gender).
Personal importance. To examine whether the per-
sonal importance of the basketball game moderated the
relationship between EM and forecasting accuracy,
we entered EM and team identification scores (both
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centered), as well as their interaction, into a regression
predicting accuracy. Although the main effect of EM
was significant (β = –.57), t(34) = –4.13, p < .0005, nei-
ther the main effect of team identification nor the
Emotion Management × Team Identification interaction
approached significance, both ts < 1.
Discussion
In Study 2, individuals who were high in EI ability
made relatively accurate affective forecasts regarding
their excitement level following a big basketball game,
thereby extending the findings of Study 1 to a new event
and sample and a different aspect of emotional experi-
ence. Although multiple domains of EI were correlated
with forecasting accuracy, EM again emerged as the
best predictor of accuracy. Furthermore, the effect of
EM remained significant after controlling for degree of
identification with the basketball team. Team identifi-
cation also failed to moderate the relationship between
EM and accuracy. This finding casts additional doubt
on the consistency-motive explanation; according to
this alternative explanation, the relationship between EI
and accuracy index scores should be higher when an
event is personally important (as a school basketball
game is for people who strongly identify with the team).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The research reported here provides the first evidence
of stable, predictable individual differences in affective
forecasting accuracy. A performance measure of EI—but
not a self-report measure—reliably predicted the accu-
racy of participants’ affective forecasts. 4 This relationship
between EI and forecast accuracy appeared in the context
of emotion-relevant events in three quite different arenas:
politics, academics, and sports. EM emerged as the most
critical aspect of EI for predicting forecasting accuracy,
although there was some evidence of relationships
between accuracy and other domains of EI.
The fact that the relationship between EI and forecast-
ing ability is best explained by EM suggests that when
making forecasts, people high in this ability recognize
how they will up- or down-regulate emotions in the face
of affective events, leading them to make more realistic
assessments of their postevent feelings. People who score
high on the EM domain of the MSCEIT realize that emo-
tional responses are not a simple function of an event’s
occurrence, instead appreciating how emotions following
an event can be mitigated or reinforced by both internal
factors (e.g., direction of attention) and external factors
(e.g., interaction partners). In essence, high-EM individu-
als have an intuitive understanding of one of the central
conclusions of happiness research, and of social psychol-
ogy more broadly: Well-being depends less on the objec-
tive events one encounters than on how those events are
construed, dealt with, and shared with others. Because
high-EM individuals recognize this core concept and pos-
sess specific knowledge about how various subjective
construals, coping strategies, and social situations can
modify emotional responses to events, they are likely to
have a pervasive advantage in making affective forecasts.
Although we found that EM was the best predictor
of forecasting ability, the other domains of EI are not
irrelevant. Indeed, the MSCEIT is constructed hierar-
chically, with EM at the top because of its reliance on
the other domains; to manage emotions effectively, one
must first be able to monitor, discriminate, and label
feelings appropriately. It is therefore not terribly sur-
prising that (a) significant zero-order correlations emerged
between forecasting accuracy and the Use and Under-
standing domains of EI in Study 2 and (b) EM accounted
for the most unique variance when all four domains
were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression
predicting accuracy in Studies 1 and 2.
Of course, it is still notable that the Understanding
Emotions domain was uncorrelated with accuracy in
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TABLE 3: Correlation Matrix (Study 2)
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Forecast accuracy — –.49** [–.50**] –.59** [–.60**] .07 .21 –.17 –.07
2. MSCEIT-total — .78** .00 –.02 .22 .32†
3. MSCEIT-EM — –.10 –.17 .15 .31†
4. SREIS-total — .65** .31† –.11
5. SREIS-EM — .04 –.36*
6. Team identification — .03
7. Gender —
NOTE: Coefficients in brackets are partial correlations, controlling for gender; all other coefficients are zero-order correlations. The forecast
accuracy index was calculated such that higher numbers indicate poorer accuracy. MSCEIT = Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test;
EM = Emotion Management; SREIS = Self-Rated Emotional Intelligence Test. Gender was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female; for calculation of
partial correlations, missing values of gender were set to .50 (sample mean).
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
Study 1 and that it failed to account for unique variance
(above and beyond EM) in both studies. We suspect that
our selection of events may have been responsible for the
limited predictive contribution of the Understanding
Emotions domain. In undertaking a first investigation of
individual differences in forecasting accuracy, we inten-
tionally selected events that have been commonly studied
within the affective forecasting literature. These events
(similar to most events studied in the extant forecasting
literature) involve fairly straightforward gains or losses.
Wilson and Gilbert (2003) argue that even while going
astray in predicting the intensity of their emotional reac-
tions, most people should be reasonably adept at predict-
ing the specific emotions they will experience following
such common gain/loss situations, thereby leaving high
scorers on the Understanding Emotions domain without
a special advantage. In contrast, more complicated situa-
tions (e.g., an unwanted pregnancy) should provoke a rel-
atively complex and dynamic blend of emotions, which
might be anticipated more accurately by individuals who
score high on Understanding Emotions. Although cer-
tainly important, such complex and ambivalent situa-
tions are obviously less common than the simple gains
and losses we all experience on a daily basis; therefore,
EM is likely to have a more pervasive influence on fore-
casting accuracy than does Understanding Emotions.
Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile to examine individ-
ual differences in accuracy regarding the specific emo-
tions (e.g., anger vs. contempt) that would be experienced
in complex situations, a task that should favor individu-
als high in Understanding Emotions.
The present findings have intriguing implications for
research on both affective forecasting and EI. Moving
beyond the extant focus on identifying situational influ-
ences on forecasting errors and biases, the current study
highlights the potentially important role of individual
difference variables (i.e., emotion-related skills) in shap-
ing forecast accuracy. Furthermore, our findings suggest
that people lack self-insight regarding their own capac-
ity for self-insight, that is, people’s self-reports of EI (on
the SREIS) were uncorrelated with both their MSCEIT
scores and with affective forecasting accuracy. These
findings are consistent with past research demonstrating
that performance tests as opposed to self-report mea-
sures of EI predict important criteria, including mental
health and social competence (Brackett et al., in press;
Brackett & Mayer, 2003). The findings reported here
also extend the validity of performance tests of EI to a
novel outcome: intertemporal self-knowledge.
Still, on a practical level, one might wonder whether
the individual differences in forecasting accuracy observed
here have meaningful implications for everyday life; after
all, even if our more inaccurate participants felt happier or
sadder than they expected after George Bush’s victory,
surely most of them would stand by their vote. As noted
by Gilbert (2005), however, discrepancies between affec-
tive forecasts and emotional experiences can give rise to
more striking discrepancies between planned and enacted
behavior—few of the Kerry voters who anticipated lasting
depression and a resulting move to Canada have actually
made their way north of the border. Although occasional
discrepancies between planned and enacted behavior may
be relatively innocuous, few would gladly relinquish the
ability to plan behavior and make behavioral trade-offs
based on an accurate assessment of their own future feel-
ings. Furthermore, to the extent that understanding how
someone else would feel in a given situation depends on
correctly envisioning one’s own feelings in that situation,
the ability to make consistently accurate affective forecasts
should be valuable for salespeople, policy makers, and
anyone whose life or livelihood depends on interacting
successfully with other people.
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1. For the election event, we calculated the difference between par-
ticipants’ actual happiness on November 4th and how happy they had
predicted feeling that day, given a George Bush win. Similarly, for
participants who scored one or two steps higher than expected on the
paper, we subtracted their predicted happiness given that grade from
their actual happiness after getting their grade. For participants who
scored one or two steps lower than expected, we subtracted their pre-
dicted sadness given that grade from their actual sadness after getting
their paper back.
2. The reelection of George Bush represented a negative event for
most participants; on Election Day, 82% reported a preference for
Kerry, 13% reported a preference for Bush, and 5% did not report a
preference for either. In contrast, the term paper represented a posi-
tive event for the majority of participants, with 60% scoring higher
than they expected. Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test (MSCEIT) scores were unrelated to candidate preferences and to
paper grades (ps > .50).
3. We argue that affective forecasts are better calibrated with
actual experiences among individuals high in emotional intelligence
(EI), but the present findings could have emerged if high-EI partici-
pants either made more moderate affective forecasts or reported more
moderate emotional experiences; because our primary dependent vari-
able is a difference score, the extremity of either forecasts or experi-
ences could be responsible for our results, creating a possible artifact.
To examine the extremity issue, we calculated each participant’s devi-
ation from the midpoint of 5 on each 9-point forecast and experience
scale (e.g., participants would have received a deviation score of 2 if
they selected either 3 or 7 on a given scale). Midpoint deviation scores
were not reliably related to MSCEIT-Total or MSCEIT-Emotion
Management scores (all ps > .30). Furthermore, examining the zero-
order correlations between affective forecasts, emotional experiences,
and EI revealed no consistent pattern. Thus, high-EI individuals did
not simply report less extreme forecasts or experiences, suggesting
that the calibration between forecasts and experiences (rather than the
extremity of either) underlies the present findings.
4. Although the focus of our investigation was on forecasting
accuracy rather than bias, we conducted additional analyses to exam-
ine whether EI was related to a tendency to overestimate versus under-
estimate intensity of emotional experience. Subtracting experiences
from forecasts to create a raw difference score for each participant, we
found no systematic relationship between EI and directionality of
forecasting errors. For the term paper, the raw difference score was
unrelated to total EI scores (r = – .10, ns) or Emotion Management
Dunn et al. / EI AND AFFECTIVE FORECASTING 93(EM) scores on the MSCEIT (r = –.08, ns). For the election, the raw
difference score was significantly related to total EI (r = .22, p = .05)
and EM (r = .29, p = .007); high EI was associated with a tendency to
predict greater happiness than was actually experienced, and this rela-
tionship was significant for both Bush and Kerry voters, even though
the election represented a positive event for the former and a negative
event for the latter. Finally, for the basketball game in Study 2, the
raw difference score was unrelated to total EI (r = –.05, ns) or EM (r
= –.11, ns). Therefore, there is no evidence in the present research that
EI is related to a systematic bias toward either underestimation or
overestimation of emotional experience.Received December 31, 2005
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